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Abstract
‘Hyperfocus’ is a phenomenon that reflects one’s complete absorption in a task, to a point where a person appears to com-
pletely ignore or ‘tune out’ everything else. Hyperfocus is most often mentioned in the context of autism, schizophrenia, 
and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, but research into its effect on cognitive and neural functioning is limited. We 
propose that hyperfocus is a critically important aspect of cognition, particularly with regard to clinical populations, and that 
it warrants significant investigation. Hyperfocus, though ostensibly self-explanatory, is poorly defined within the literature. 
In many cases, hyperfocus goes undefined, relying on the assumption that the reader inherently knows what it entails. Thus, 
there is no single consensus to what constitutes hyperfocus. Moreover, some studies do not refer to hyperfocus by name, but 
describe processes that may be related. In this paper, we review how hyperfocus (as well as possibly related phenomena) 
has been defined and measured, the challenges associated with hyperfocus research, and assess how hyperfocus affects both 
neurotypical and clinical populations. Using this foundation, we provide constructive criticism about previously used methods 
and analyses. We also propose an operational definition of hyperfocus for researchers to use moving forward.
What is hyperfocus?
Hyperfocus, broadly and anecdotally speaking, is a phenom-
enon that reflects one’s complete absorption in a task, to a 
point where a person appears to completely ignore or ‘tune 
out’ everything else. It is generally reported to occur when 
a person is engaged in an activity that is particularly fun 
or interesting. An example of hyperfocus is when a child 
becomes engrossed in a video game to a point where they 
do not hear a parent calling their name. Although most 
neurotypical people would likely report experiencing a 
hyperfocus-like state at some point in their life, it is most 
often mentioned in the context of autism, schizophrenia, and 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder—conditions that have 
consequences on attentional abilities. Despite the experi-
ence of hyperfocus being ubiquitous, in both neurotypical 
and psychiatric populations, there is very limited explicit 
academic research into its effect on cognitive and neural 
functioning. A Google Scholar search (excluding citations) 
for hyperfocus and variations of the term, namely “hyper-
focus”, “hyper focus”, “hyperfocusing”, “hyper-focusing”, 
and “hyper focusing” in the title, returned 6 results. A 
PubMed search for the same terms in the title or abstract 
returned 19 results. Of these, 7 are empirical studies explic-
itly focused on assessing cognitive and neural states associ-
ated with hyperfocus (in ADHD: Sklar, 2013; Ozel-Kizil 
et  al., 2013, 2016; in schizophrenia: Luck et  al., 2014; 
Sawaki et al., 2017; Kreither et al., 2017; Hahn et al., 2016; 
Gray et al., 2014). An additional result is a paper that has 
developed a new questionnaire to assess hyperfocus experi-
ences (Hupfeld, Abagis, & Shah, 2019). We also found 1 
study that did not appear in our searches, but was cited in 
a couple of the papers cited above (Ozel-Kizil, 2013). This 
naturally leads to a simple question: why is there limited 
explicit research on an ostensibly common human cognitive 
and perceptual experience?
In this review, we will attempt to explain why hyperfocus 
research has been so limited and we will assess if other phe-
nomena in the literature may essentially be hyperfocus going 
by another name. Based on this, we will propose a clear and 
testable operational definition of hyperfocus. Finally, we will 
assess if the definitions of hyperfocus used in the psychiatric 
literature match our proposed operational definition.
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Why has hyperfocus been forgotten?
There are three major issues to consider. First, there is no 
clear general or operational definition of hyperfocus in the 
literature, which usually assumes that the reader inherently 
knows what it is. As there is limited explicit literature on the 
topic, references to and descriptions of hyperfocus are typi-
cally anecdotal and can differ from paper to paper. Table 1 
reflects a comprehensive collection of how the few studies 
that have explicitly studied hyperfocus have defined it, as 
well as a representative sample of references to hyperfocus 
in the ADHD, autism, and schizophrenia literature where 
it was not the explicit focus of research. For example, Kahl 
and Wahl (2006) reported that adults with ADHD could 
“hyperfocus” on activities in which they have special inter-
est but did not define what cognitive or subjective experi-
ences are associated with hyperfocusing. It is important to 
note that in most of these papers, these are the only refer-
ences or descriptions of hyperfocus at any point throughout 
(with some exceptions; See Sklar, 2013), and they rarely 
provide an operational definition that can be tested. When 
it is defined, it is rarely operationally defined in a way that 
can be used for quantitative research. Ozel-Kizil et al. (2013; 
also see Ozel-Kizil et al., 2014) defined hyperfocusing as 
being “characterized by intensive concentration on interest-
ing and non-routine activities accompanied by temporar-
ily diminished perception of the environment”. However, 
this definition raises several questions, such as what defines 
something as interesting? Does it have to produce enjoy-
ment, like a video game, or is an important homework 
assignment enough? And how is the perception of the envi-
ronment diminished? The exceptions to this are the papers in 
the schizophrenia section of Table 1 (all of which come from 
the same lab group and use the same operational definition 
of hyperfocus), but we will discuss these in further detail 
later in the paper and assess if they provide an appropriate 
operational definition.
Despite these issues, there appear to be four general 
features or criteria of hyperfocus that are consistently 
reported (Table 1):
1. Hyperfocus is characterized by an intense state of con-
centration/focus.
2. When engaged in hyperfocus, unrelated external stimuli 
do not appear to be consciously perceived; sometimes 
reported as a diminished perception of the environment.
3. To engage in hyperfocus, the task has to be fun or inter-
esting.
4. During a hyperfocus state, task performance improves.
Second, it is very difficult to experimentally manipu-
late a subject into a hyperfocus state (Sklar, 2013). The 
nature of hyperfocus is such that a person must be com-
pletely absorbed in a task that is interesting or fun. How-
ever, most cognitive psychology experiments do not meet 
this requirement. Even if subjects are able to enter into 
a hyperfocus state with some interesting activity, having 
them respond to a non-task relevant stimulus will break 
them out of the hyperfocus state. This prevents monitor-
ing of cognitive functioning while the hyperfocus state is 
occurring, or at least makes it very difficult to do.
Third, some studies do not refer to hyperfocus by name, 
but describe processes that appear to be related, such as 
“in the zone” and “flow”. For example, several research-
ers (e.g., Esterman, Noonan, Rosenberg, & DeGutis 2012, 
Esterman, Rosenberg & Noonan 2014; Fortenbaugh et al., 
2015; Kucyi, Hove, Esterman, Hutchison, & Valera, 2017) 
measured performance during a sustained attention task 
while participants were “in the zone”, a state defined by 
reduced variability in task performance. Dietrich (2004), 
on the other hand, assessed the neural correlates of “flow”, 
defined subjectively as a state of intense concentration 
with the loss of reflective self-consciousness. However, it 
is unclear if “in the zone” states, “flow” states, and “hyper-
focus” states reflect the same or distinct processes.
This review was motivated by the lack of clarity and 
consistency across the academic literature with respect 
to hyperfocus. As such, we intend this paper to address 
the following issues. First, has hyperfocus been explic-
itly studied, just under a different name? Therefore, in 
the next section of this paper, we examine the literature 
on related phenomena, namely “in the zone” and “flow” 
states—which at face value appear to instantiate the same 
subjective experiences and behavioral effects—to evaluate 
if they reflect a similar or distinct process from hyperfo-
cus. It is important to note here that the notion of “in the 
zone” reported in this review is distinct from the notion of 
“in the zone” used in the flow literature—often to describe 
the flow experience. Here, when we refer to “in the zone”, 
we are referring to it as defined by Esterman et al. (2012, 
2014)—performance characterized by relatively low 
variability in response times. Notably, this highlights the 
importance of clarity, specificity, and operational defini-
tions in research. Second, we will propose an operational 
definition of hyperfocus. And third, as hyperfocus is most 
often referenced in relation to psychiatric disorders, we 
will then assess if patients with ADHD, autism, or schizo-
phrenia exhibit hyperfocus-related symptoms relative to 
our proposed operational definition and if these symptoms 
are consistent across disorders. The ultimate purpose is to 
provide a common baseline for researchers of the hyper-
focus phenomenon.
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Table 1  Various descriptions of hyperfocus from the ADHD, autism and schizophrenia literature
Clinical 
population
Author(s) Description of hyperfocus
ADHD Hupfeld et al. 
(2019)*
“While the estimated 8 million adults in the USA affected by attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 
might find it nearly impossible to sit still in a lecture hall or excruciatingly challenging to focus on writing a 
term paper, these same individuals might find themselves spending hours at a time composing a new song, 
tinkering with their car, writing computer code, or watching television (Kessler et al., 2006). The term 
“hyperfocus” (HF) has been used to characterize this state of heightened, focused attention that individuals 
with ADHD frequently report (Brown, 2005; Conner, 1994; Ozel-Kizil et al., 2016).”
Ozel-Kizil et al. 
(2016)*
“ ‘Hyperfocusing’ is defined as a clinical phenomenon of “locking on” to a task in patients with ADHD who 
have a difficulty of shifting their attention from one subject to another, especially if the subject is about 
their interests (Conner, 1994). Hyperfocusing was mentioned as a state resembling a “hypnotic spell”, 
according to the subjective experiences of the cases with ADHD (Brown, 2005)… Moreover, hyperfo-
cused individuals neglect things other than the condition they are already focused on. Patients with ADHD 
are reported to be stuck in the activities that they are interested and they keep on doing these things for 
hours while they lose interest in their surroundings…The patients with ADHD usually report that they 
cannot understand how the time passes. During hyperfocusing, the individuals state that they are aware of 
the things that they ignore, however they cannot give up what they are doing (Brown, 2005; Conner, 1994). 
Hyperfocusing is thought to occur on the basis of attention disorder; patients with ADHD have difficulties 
of focusing and sustaining, as well as shifting their attention.”
Ozel-Kizil et al. 
(2013)*
“Hyperfocusing, which is characterized by intensive concentration on interesting and non-routine activities 
accompanied by temporarily diminished perception of the environment, is a clinically well-known phenom-
enon in patients with attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder. It is also described as ‘locking on’ to some 
task.”
Sklar (2013)* “…hyperfocus appears to refer to a more specific (and perhaps extreme) type of sustained attention in which 
the individual’s behaviour is controlled for a long period of time by a task which is ‘non-routine’ or of 
interest to him/her, to the point that his/her awareness of the environment is considerably diminished.”
Goodwin and 
Oberacker (2011)
“Many children with ADHD have the ability to hyperfocus on certain tasks. This trait can confuse parents, 
as they see their highly distractible child engrossed in a video game, for example. They call his name but he 
has tuned them out, along with every other stimulus in the room.”
Schecklmann et al. 
(2008)
“Hyperfocusing is not mentioned in DSM-IV [with respect to ADHD], but it is known from clinical work 
and can be described as intensive concentration on interesting and non-routine activities accompanied by 
temporarily diminished perception of the environment.”
Carver (2009) “Both research and clinical experience tells us that ADHD Children [sic] can exhibit a type of “hyperfo-
cus”—intense concentration and single-minded focus when the activity is very interesting.”
Kahl and Wahl 
(2006)
“The researchers noted that “interest” probably the most frequently experience positive emotion, “is an 
extremely important motivation in the development of skills, competencies and intelligence”. The motivat-
ing power of such “interest” may be most apparent when it is absent, as described in the chronic complaints 
of many adults with ADDs who report that although they can “hyperfocus” on activities in which they 
have special interest, they chronically find themselves unable to mobilize effort for tasks in which they do 
not feel any special immediate interest, even when they are fully aware that their failure to do that uninter-
esting task may cause significant problems later.”
Autism Isomura, Ogawa, 
Shibasaki, & 
Masataka, (2015)
“Typically, children with autism are known to… pay abnormal and obsessive attention to detail, and to note 
and record their environment with exquisite clarity (Casey et al., 2008). They are capable of becoming 
hyper-focused and locked-in on apparently arbitrary subjects of interest, and of sustaining their attention 
on these subjects for unusually long periods of time…as a result of this internal hyper-focus, it would 
be more difficult for another person to command the attention of the child with autism, and it would also 
be more difficult for the child himself/herself to command his/her own attention voluntarily (Posner and 
Dehaene, 1994).”
Fein (2015) “The co-existence of strength and vulnerability encapsulated in these narratives captured essential features 
of the experience of living with Asperger’s Syndrome—a condition that itself brought valued strengths 
(the ability to hyperfocus on a topic of interest, strengths in systematic thinking, an occasionally exquisite 
sensitivity to sensory input) as well as disabilities.”
Mayes (2014) “Unlike most children with ADHD who have difficulty sustaining their focus on anything, children with 
autism can hyperfocus on activities of interest to them (e.g., spending hours twirling a string, assembling 
puzzles, drawing the same picture over and over, or reading a book).”
Meilleur, Jelenic, 
and Mottron, 
(2014)
“Alternatively, improvements in adaptive abilities may accompany loss of skills involving hyperfocus, as 
autistic people learn and adapt.” (No description of hyperfocus is provided and there is no further mention 
of it in the paper)
 Psychological Research
1 3
Table 1  (continued)
Clinical 
population
Author(s) Description of hyperfocus
Bombaci (2012) “Besides associational thinking and mindblindness, autistic subjects also tend to display extreme concentra-
tion when gazing on or thinking about objects that interest them. Other terms for autistic hyper-focus are 
‘stimming’ and ‘perseveration’. Interestingly, over-selective attention, the clinical term for this form of 
perceptual difference, echoes William James’s notion of selective attention—a perceptual ability that he 
associated with masculine power.”
Mayes, Calhoun, 
Murray, Ahuja, 
and Smith, 
(2011)
“Attention deficit, hyperactivity, and impulsivity are common in children with autism, but, unlike children 
with ADHD, children with autism have the ability to hyperfocus on activities of interest to them, such 
as spending hours twirling a string or reading a book (Mayes & Calhoun, 1999). Repetitive behaviors in 
autism (e.g., spinning wheels on a car or drawing the same pictures over and over) are often driven by 
pleasure…”
Geurts et al. (2009) “Difficulties in shifting attention, disengaging attention from details (i.e., hyperfocus)”
Schizophre-
nia
Luck et al. (2019)* “This new hypothesis states that schizophrenia involves an aberrant hyperfocusing of processing resources 
on a small number of representations. In other words, even when the task requires perceiving or remember-
ing multiple objects or locations, PSZ [patients with schizophrenia] tend to focus intensely but narrowly.”
Sawaki et al. 
(2017)*
“…the hyperfocusing hypothesis, which proposes that PSZ [patients with schizophrenia] tend to focus their 
processing resources more intensely but more narrowly than HCS [healthy controls] as a result of disrupted 
attractor dynamics that tend to create deeper basins of attraction and produce exaggerated winner-take-all 
processing (Luck et al., 2014)”
Luck et al. (2014)* “… processing resources are focused more intensely but more narrowly in PSZ [patients with schizophrenia] 
than in healthy control subjects (HCS [healthy controls]). In other words, PSZ [patients with schizophre-
nia] focus unusually strongly on some sources of information to the exclusion of others. We call this the 
hyperfocusing hypothesis.”
Gray et al. (2014)* “We speculate that impairments in the Divided Attention subtest, and in part also reduced WM [working 
memory] capacity, reflect an underlying abnormality in the dynamics of local cortical circuits in PSZ 
[patients with schizophrenia]. Briefly, we propose that an imbalance between excitatory and inhibitory 
function tends to cause exaggerated local inhibition and an increase in winner-take-all processing. This 
winner-take-all processing mode is suggested to cause a ‘hyperfocusing’ of resources onto a small number 
of locations or objects, whether they are currently visible (as in the Divided Attention subtest) or being held 
in memory (as in our WM [working memory] task). When applied to external representations, the tendency 
to hyperfocus may lead to deficits in dividing attention among multiple targets or spreading attention 
among multiple locations or a broad area in space. When hyperfocusing is applied to internal representa-
tions, this would lead to a reduction in the number of items, rules, or response alternatives that can be 
simultaneously active, which could compromise more complex cognitive operations.”
Leonard et al. 
(2012)*
“Recent work has instead found that schizophrenia is associated with a ‘failure’ to attend broadly (Elahipanah 
et al. 2011; Hahn et al. 2012), suggesting that impaired WM [working memory] capacity estimates in PSZ 
[patients with schizophrenia] may reflect a tendency to hyperfocus on a subset of the relevant information 
rather than an inability to filter irrelevant information.”
Hahn et al. (2016)* “…it has been suggested that PSZ [patients with schizophrenia] have a narrowed “attentional spotlight” and 
difficulty maintaining a wide visual span
We followed up on these findings with a visuospatial Allocation Task (SARAT), in which a central cue 
predicts the location of a peripheral target stimulus… One, 2, or all 4 possible target locations could be 
cued simultaneously, manipulating the degree to which attention had to be focused narrowly or distributed 
broadly. Both HCS [healthy controls] and PSZ [patients with schizophrenia] displayed step-wise faster RT 
with more precise cueing. However, this effect was substantially larger in PSZ [patients with schizophre-
nia] than in HCS [healthy controls]. Potential explanations for this finding are that (1) PSZ [patients with 
schizophrenia] “hyperfocused” the location to which a predictive cue directed their attention, resulting in 
disproportionate RT benefits in predictive cue trials, or (2) PSZ [patients with schizophrenia] had difficulty 
distributing attention broadly, resulting in greater RT costs when there was no advance information about 
the target location.”
Prentky (2001) “Positive symptoms, as Gruzelier and Raine (1994) reported, are associated with higher left than right hemi-
spheric activity, supporting the hypothesis that general overactivation of the left hemisphere or underacti-
vation of the right hemisphere characterizes the C-type. Thus, there is a hypothetical optimal hemispheric 
imbalance that promotes a constructive, task-specific hyperfocus on detail and facilitates problem solving 
but does not seriously incapacitate or debilitate the individual.”
Entries with an asterisk are papers which explicitly studied hyperfocus
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Hyperfocus and possibly related 
phenomena
Hyperfocus and flow
Flow was one of the first concepts introduced as part of the 
field of ‘Positive Psychology,’ which focuses on the “science 
of positive subjective experience, positive individual traits, and 
positive institutions” (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, 
p. 5; also see Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005; Rich, 
2013; Lopez and Snyder, 2009). According to Nakamura and 
Csikszentmihalyi (2009, p. 195–196; also see Nakamura and 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2002; Csikszentmihalyi 1975, 1997, 2000),
The conditions for entering flow include:
• perceived challenges, or opportunities for action, 
that stretch but do not overmatch existing skills;
• clear proximal goals and immediate feedback about 
the progress being made.
Under these conditions, experience seamlessly unfolds 
from moment to moment and one enters a subjective 
state with the following characteristics:
• intense and focused concentration on the present 
moment;
• merging of action and awareness;
• loss of reflective self-consciousness (i.e., loss of 
awareness of oneself as a social actor);
• a sense that one can control one’s actions; that is, 
a sense that one can in principle deal with the situ-
ation because one knows how to respond to what-
ever happens next;
• distortion of temporal experience (typically a sense 
that time has passed faster than normal);
• experience of the activity as intrinsically reward-
ing, such that often the end goal is just an excuse 
for the process.
The conditions for entering flow and the subjective expe-
riences associated with it appear to map onto the most com-
monly reported features of hyperfocus (Table 2). Therefore, 
we propose that flow and hyperfocus are the same phenom-
enon. Although we are mindful that just because two phe-
nomena are descriptively similar, they are not necessarily 
mechanistically identical, there is no evidence to suggest that 
either flow or hyperfocus are distinct. From our reading of 
the literature, we note that the psychiatric literature is more 
likely to use the word hyperfocus and positive psychology 
literature is more likely to use the word flow, despite the 
phenomenology being almost identical. With this in mind, 
the flow literature can be used as a framework to understand 
hyperfocus. Here, we review the literature on flow in con-
junction with cognitive psychology literature on attention 
with an emphasis on assessing if these literatures can pro-
vide insight into hyperfocus, specifically with respect to the 
common features we identified earlier. We will also review 
the limited research on the neural correlates of flow to assess 
the possible neural correlates mediating hyperfocus. Fur-
thermore, if the flow literature provides sufficient evidence 
of the phenomenology associated with hyperfocus, then we 
can be more confident that these are the same processes. If 
not, then we would have to re-evaluate this claim.
Table 2  Common descriptive features of hyperfocus and flow, based on the most commonly reported features of hyperfocus and Nakamura and 
Csikszentmihalyi’s (2009) criteria for flow
Hyperfocus criteria Corresponding flow criteria/experiences
Hyperfocus is characterized by an intense state of concentration/focus Intense and focused concentration on the present moment
When engaged in hyperfocus, unrelated external stimuli do not 
appear to be consciously perceived; sometimes reported as a dimin-
ished perception of the environment
Merging of action and awareness
Loss of reflective self-consciousness (i.e., loss of awareness of oneself as 
a social actor)
Distortion of temporal experience (typically a sense that time has passed 
faster than normal)
To engage in hyperfocus, the task has to be fun or interesting Experience of the activity as intrinsically rewarding, such that often the 
end goal is just an excuse for the process
Perceived challenges, or opportunities for action, that stretch but do not 
overmatch existing skills
During a hyperfocus state, task performance improves A sense that one can control one’s actions; that is, a sense that one can in 
principle deal with the situation because one knows how to respond to 
whatever happens next
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Criterion 1: to engage a hyperfocus, the task has to be fun 
or interesting
Linnell and Caparos (2013; Linnell, Caparos, de Fockert, 
& Davidoff, 2013, Linnell, Bremner, Caparos, Davidoff, 
& de Fockert, 2018) have suggested attentional/cognitive 
engagement, rather than task difficulty (such as in perceptual 
load theory; Murphy, Groeger, & Greene. 2016; Makovski, 
Hommel, & Humphreys 2014; Lavie, 1995; Lavie and Tsal, 
1994), to be the critical factor in determining the scope of 
attentional function during a task. Engeser and Rheinberg 
(2008) examined the effect of perceived importance on flow. 
Flow was measured with the Flow Short Scale (Rheinberg, 
Engeser, & Vollmeyer 2002), a ten-item questionnaire 
designed to assess flow experiences. During a low impor-
tance task (playing the video game pac-man), flow was high-
est when there was equal perceived difficulty of the task and 
perceived skill at the task by the subjects (termed skills-
demand compatibility), compared to when the task was easy 
or hard. For a high importance task (studying for a university 
level statistics test that required a passing grade to continue 
on with the degree program), they found that flow was high 
when the task was easy and when there was a skills-demand 
compatibility, compared to when the task was hard. Simi-
larly, Schüler (2007) measured subjects’ achievement motive 
before and after an academic lecture (with a 1-week interval 
in between testing sessions) and it was found that those who 
were motivated by their ‘hope of success,’ as compared to 
‘fear of failure,’ experienced flow during the lecture. In both 
of these studies, increased perceived importance of the task 
arguably increased the subject’s motivation to engage in it 
and subsequently moderated the conditions under which 
flow was achieved. In terms of flow, this suggests that the 
“experience of the activity as intrinsically rewarding”, may 
in fact be one of the criteria for entering a flow state, rather 
than an effect of these states. In terms of hyperfocus, it sug-
gests that engaging hyperfocus requires task engagement, 
which would simply be more common during fun or inter-
esting tasks.
Criteria 2 and 3: intense state of concentration; external 
stimuli do not appear to be consciously perceived/
diminished perception of the environment
In terms of cognitive psychology, we could phrase “intense 
concentration” as the intense engagement of sustained and 
selective attention mechanisms. Unfortunately, there are lim-
ited cognitive studies of attentional processes in the flow 
literature. As with the hyperfocus literature, this is largely 
due to the reasons discussed at the beginning of this review. 
Although mostly speculative, this section highlights atten-
tional processes that may contribute to flow and hyperfocus. 
As attention is a limited resource, if a significant amount of 
those resources are focused on a particular task, peripheral 
and task irrelevant information may be lost (such as in per-
ceptual load: see references above; and inattentional blind-
ness: Simons and Chabris, 1999; Simons, 2000; Stothart, 
Wright, Simons, & Boot, 2017). In this case, subjects in a 
flow state will not pay attention to their own actions beyond 
what is required for the task, resulting in a ‘loss of reflec-
tive self-consciousness’, nor will they be paying attention 
to the time passing, resulting in ‘the distortion of temporal 
experience.’ In fact, there is ample evidence that attention 
is required for conscious awareness (Taylor, 2002; Cohen, 
Cavanagh, Chun, & Nakayama 2012; Dehaene, Changeux, 
Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent 2006; but see Lamme, 2003 
and Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007 for a dissenting viewpoint) and 
for accurate time perception (Brown, 1985). When refer-
encing hyperfocus, the literature refers to the “diminished 
perception of the environment” (Sklar, 2013; Schecklmann 
et al., 2008), which one could argue may be due to similar 
mechanisms and result in similar experiences as the effects 
of flow that were just described. That being said, efficient 
engagement of attentional resources could also produce an 
apparent diminished perception of the environment. Cru-
cially, these explanations may not be mutually exclusive. For 
example, it is possible that attention is efficiently engaged 
such that external distractors could be processed and sup-
pressed, but time perception is still impaired due to a lack of 
available resources. A corresponding set of effects could also 
occur with respect to information that is relevant to the task. 
In fact, the well-known phenomenon of the attentional blink 
(Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992; Dux and Marois, 2009; 
Shapiro, Hanslmayr, Enns, & Lleras 2017) shows that under 
conditions of significant attentional engagement even cen-
trally presented, task relevant information may be ignored.
Unfortunately, this way of thinking about flow has rarely 
been applied in an experimental context. In a notable excep-
tion, Castellar, Antons, Marinazzo, and Looy (2019; also 
see Allison and Polich (2008) had participants engage in an 
auditory novelty oddball task while simultaneously play-
ing a video game under three conditions (manipulated by 
adjusting the difficulty of the game): boredom, frustration, 
and flow. The results showed that the participants made more 
errors in the oddball task during the flow condition, than 
boredom or frustration, suggesting they were focused more 
intently on the video game during the flow state (measured 
with a questionnaire given after the task) and that they did 
not perceive “external” stimuli (relative to the video game) 
as efficiently. This study also included EEG measurements, 
but that will be discussed further in the next section. Future 
research will have to continue to investigate the relationship 
between flow and cognitive functioning with sophisticated 
cognitive paradigms like this.
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Criterion 4: task performance improves
It is critical to ask ‘Does flow/hyperfocus actually improve 
performance?’ Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues (Csiksze-
ntmihalyi, 1997; 2000; Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi, 
2009) have consistently described flow as a state that pro-
duces inherently high performance, yet there is limited evi-
dence to support this statement. Keller, Bless, Blomann, and 
Kleinböhl (2011); Keller, Ringelhan, and Blomann (2011) 
conducted a study in which subjects were presented with 
a computerized knowledge task; they were presented with 
a question and had to select an answer from four response 
options. There were three separate experimental conditions: 
boredom, fit, and overload. In the boredom condition, the 
questions were consistently very easy throughout the blocks. 
In the fit (or adaptive) condition, the difficulty of the ques-
tions was adapted based on performance (when they got a 
question right, the next one was harder; when they got one 
wrong, the next one was easier). It was predicted that the 
fit condition would produce a flow state. In the overload 
condition, the difficulty of the questions was consistently 
too hard for the subjects throughout the blocks.1 After the 
knowledge task, subjects filled out a questionnaire indicating 
if they experienced flow or felt that skills-demand compat-
ibility was met. Throughout this study, heart rate variabil-
ity (HRV) was measured as a dependent variable, with the 
logic that a low HRV was indicative of mental involvement 
and/or strain. Subjects reported being ‘more involved’ with 
the fit condition than the boredom and overload conditions. 
Additionally, it was reported that HRV was significantly 
decreased in the fit and overload condition compared to the 
boredom condition. The difference in HRV between fit and 
overload conditions was not significant.2 A second experi-
ment following a similar procedure, but measuring salivary 
cortisol (an indicator of stress), found that subjects pro-
duced more cortisol in the fit and overload conditions com-
pared to the boredom conditions. There was no difference 
between the overload and fit conditions. It was reasoned that 
increased stress would be expected in the overload condition, 
as subjects would be struggling to succeed, but that the same 
levels of stress in the fit condition is surprising. Keller et al., 
(2011) argued that despite the generally positive subjective 
experience associated with flow, “flow experiences can be 
considered as involving straining tension and mental load 
from a physiological perspective”. This can be interpreted 
that the brain is in fact ‘working harder’ than normal, lend-
ing credence to the idea that people might perform better 
during a flow state. However, these studies only provide 
indirect and speculative evidence that performance might 
increase during a flow state because one’s brain appears to 
be working harder.
Other studies have also provided more, albeit still indirect, 
evidence of increased performance in flow states (Schüler 
2007; Jin, 2012; Engeser and Rheinberg, 2008; Keller and 
Bless, 2008). Keller and Bless (2008) had subjects play 
the video game Tetris under varying difficulty conditions 
(Adaptive, Boredom, and Overload) and found that subjects 
in the adaptive condition (where subjects purportedly were 
in a flow state) had higher top scores than subjects in the 
other conditions. This was interpreted as evidence that flow 
experiences result in improved performance. Additionally, 
Schüler (2007; experiment 2) reported that flow experience3 
was a significant predictor of exam performance, such that 
more intense flow experiences were associated with higher 
grades. However, as all of this evidence is correlational, 
causal relationships cannot be inferred. In fact, Jin (2012) 
has suggested that the direction of the relationship between 
performance and flow may be the opposite; her study found 
that high performance while playing a video game was a 
predictor of experiencing flow.
Based on this, it is unclear if task performance actually 
improves during flow or hyperfocus states. One possibility 
is that flow states simply make people feel as if they were 
doing better than usual, rather than actually improving per-
formance. The flow experiences of the ‘merging of action 
and awareness’ and having ‘a sense that one can control 
one’s actions’ may be explained by the fact that more atten-
tional resources are deployed towards the relevant informa-
tion than is typical, resulting in faster processing of infor-
mation (Carrasco & McElree, 2001; Carrasco, Giordano, & 
McElree, 2006; Noguchi, Tanabe, Sadato, Hoshiyama, & 
Kakigi 2007). According to the ease-of-processing heuristic 
(Kornell, Rhodes, Castel, & Tauber, 2011), information that 
is processed quickly is judged to be learned better than more 
slowly processed information. In addition, Winkleman and 
Cacioppo (2001; see also Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman 
2004) showed that faster processing of information results 
in higher positive affect. This could give subjects the impres-
sion that they always know what to do because they are mak-
ing quick judgments that they feel good about, regardless if 
they are correct. Of course, this will require explicit testing 
in the future.
1 Some details of the study were not reported by the authors. For 
example, the threshold criterion in the staircase procedure was 
not reported nor was if the overload condition adapted to subjects 
responses.
2 The authors reported that HRV for overload and fit differed at 
‘trend level’ significance (p < .10), which is an invalid interpretation 
that is reported properly here. However, because of this, they inter-
preted HRV as being uniquely low in the fit condition and do not 
address the serious theoretical implications of there being no signifi-
cant difference between the fit and overload conditions.
3 It is unclear from the paper if the ‘flow experience’ that influenced 
exam performance occurred over the class lectures or during the 
exam itself.
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The neural correlates of flow
Research into the neural correlates of flow is limited. 
Dietrich (2004) proposed a theoretical framework based on 
the idea that information processing consists of an explicit 
(i.e., conscious, voluntary) and implicit (i.e., unconscious, 
automatic) system. In this framework, flow is associated 
with suppression of activity in the explicit system, specifi-
cally the frontal and prefrontal cortex—referred to as “tran-
sient hypofrontality”. According to Dietrich (2004), this 
allows the implicit network to be engaged without inter-
ruption, producing flow states. However, Weber, Tamborini, 
Westcott-Baker, and Kantor (2009) point out that Dietrich’s 
(2004) framework does not account for flow as an attentional 
phenomenon (see below for an alternative framework). To 
our knowledge, only one study has explicitly investigated 
the neural correlates of flow in a healthy population. As 
described in an earlier section. Castellar et al. (2019) had 
participants engage in an auditory novelty oddball task while 
simultaneously playing a video game during a flow state and, 
based on the behavioural data from the oddball task, ostensi-
bly less intense attentional states (boredom and frustration). 
During the task, EEG measurements were recorded, and they 
found a delayed (by 24 ms on average) midfrontal negativity 
during the flow condition, which was interpreted as “a neu-
ral correlate of executive attentional processes involved in 
top-down cognitive control operations… reflecting executive 
processes as defined in the three-network view of attention… 
(p. 9)”. Moreover, Raz and Buhle (2006) reviewed fMRI 
research on the three attention networks (alerting, orienting, 
and executive) and reported that the alerting and executive 
function networks were both independently associated with 
increased frontal cortex activity, notably in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex. Other 
non-frontal brain regions have also been associated with 
attentional processes and executive control, such as the pari-
etal cortex and subcortical regions, but we focus on fron-
tal regions here in response to the transient hypofrontality 
framework. Therefore, if we posit that flow (or hyperfocus) 
is first and foremost an attentional phenomenon, then these 
results may contrast Dietrich’s (2004) notion of “transient 
hypofrontality” as the trigger for flow states.
That being said, we urge caution in inferring attentional 
processes based on increased or decreased frontal activation, 
a rationale known as reverse inference. There is some debate 
on the value of both formal and informal reverse inference 
in neuroimaging data (Sprooten et al., 2017; Poldrack 2011; 
Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011; Pol-
drack, 2006) and a full treatment of this is beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, most relevant to our purposes is that 
Poldrack (2011) has argued that reverse inference is useful 
as a method to generate novel hypotheses. In other words, 
we cannot say based on the current literature that increased 
frontal activation in alerting and executive functions con-
tradicts transient hypofrontality during flow states, because 
frontal activity does not inherently imply the engagement of 
attentional control, but the literature does provide enough 
evidence to justify the development of a study designed to 
test this possibility. And we would encourage readers to do 
just that!
Another theoretical framework was proposed by Weber 
et al. (2009), suggesting that flow states are the result of syn-
chronization between attentional (particularly alerting and 
orienting) and reward networks—states that can be induced 
when there is a balance between skill and challenge in a 
task. They argue that synchronization has fewer metabolic 
demands than non-synchronous brain activity, that it is a 
particularly efficient method of information processing, that 
it is a mechanism for conscious awareness, and that it mani-
fests subjectively as a pleasurable experience. It should be 
noted that Weber et al. (2009) provided this definition spe-
cifically in the context of media, such as video games. The 
available empirical data relating to this theory is both limited 
and mixed. Only one study we found attempts to explic-
itly test this theory. Klasen, Weber, Kircher, Mathiak, and 
Mathiak (2012) showed activation in the reward and alerting 
network in response to the skill/challenge balance during 
a video game, arguing that it supported the notion of syn-
chronization between reward and attention areas. Although 
critically, this is indirect evidence as they did not obtain any 
explicit measures of functional connectivity or synchroniza-
tion. However, other studies that were not explicitly designed 
to test the synchronization theory, nevertheless provide con-
tradictory evidence. For example, Kucyi et al. (2017) found 
that, during a rhythmic tapping task, increased functional 
connectivity between and within the default mode network 
(DMN) and the salience network was associated with “out 
of the zone” attention. To the extent that “out of the zone” 
contrasts “the flow state” (see discussion in following sec-
tion), this interpretation contradicts the notion that increased 
synchronization is associated with more efficient informa-
tion processing. Future research will have to resolve these 
conflicting results.
Hyperfocus and being “In the Zone”
In an effort to assess moment to moment fluctuations in 
sustained attention performance, Esterman et al. (2012) 
developed the gradual continuous performance task (grad 
CPT). During the grad CPT, participants were presented 
with images of either a city scene or a mountain scene that 
would gradually transition from one to the next over the 
course of the 800 ms presentation time. Participants had to 
respond to city scenes and withhold responses during moun-
tain scenes. To assess behavioral variation in performance 
over time, Esterman et al. (2012) employed a variance time 
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course analysis, which assessed within-subject performance. 
They found that high variability epochs were associated with 
increased errors, faster RTs prior to commission errors, and 
slower RTs prior to correct responses relative to low vari-
ability epochs. As such, the low variability epochs were 
termed “in the zone” and the high variability epochs were 
termed “out of the zone”. One significant advantage of the 
variance time course analysis was that it allowed for the 
measurement of attentional states without having to directly 
probe the subjects to find out if they were “in the zone”.
Esterman et al. (2014) conducted a similar study using 
the grad CPT paradigm, but also included irrelevant dis-
tractors. In this study, participants had to respond to male 
faces, while withholding responses to female face. These 
faces were superimposed on top of mountain or city scenes 
which independently transitioned out-of-sync with the faces. 
On some trials, the background image was the same as the 
previous trial (repeat trials) and on others it changed (novel 
trials). Behaviorally, they reported that “in the zone” states 
were associated with fewer errors, suggesting improved task 
performance. Moreover, using a cortical-scene network ROI, 
regions that are selectively activated by scene images, they 
found a larger difference in the BOLD % signal change 
between novel and repeat trials (with more activity during 
novel trials) during “in the zone” epochs relative to “out of 
the zone” epochs. Because scenes were the distractors in 
their study, they argued that this was evidence of increased 
distractor processing, which was possible because of a con-
comitant reduction in perceptual load associated with the 
primary face identification task. Essentially, they argue that 
“in the zone” epochs are characterized by efficient atten-
tional engagement, while “out of the zone” epochs are char-
acterized by over engagement.
Based on these data, there do seem to be similarities 
between hyperfocus and “in the zone” epochs. Notably, the 
evidence suggests that “in the zone” states reflect intense 
engagement of sustained attention and reduced distraction. 
Critically, although numerous studies have described hyper-
focus as being associated with a temporarily diminished per-
ception of the environment (Table 1; Sklar, 2013; Ozel-Kizil 
et al., 2013; Schecklmann et al., 2008) resulting in fewer 
distractions, Esterman et al. (2014) would suggest that it may 
be associated with an enhanced perception of the environ-
ment leading to more efficient distractor suppression. How-
ever, despite the apparent similarities, “in the zone” states 
do not meet the criteria to be classified as the same process 
as hyperfocus. First, the task is not especially fun or interest-
ing beyond a traditional psychology experiment. And sec-
ond, the nature of the variance time course analysis is such 
that there is no baseline condition, so it is unclear if perfor-
mance during the “in the zone” epochs reflects enhanced 
performance or simply unimpaired performance, relative to 
impaired performance during the “out of the zone” epochs.
An operational definition of hyperfocus
Based on the above review, we propose the following 
operational definition for four distinct and testable features 
of hyperfocus: (1) hyperfocus is induced by task engage-
ment; (2) hyperfocus is characterized by an intense state 
of sustained or selective attention; (3) During a hyper-
focus state, there is a diminished perception of non-task 
relevant stimuli; and (4) During a hyperfocus state, task 
performance improves.
Flow states do show evidence that they are induced 
by at least interesting, if not fun tasks. In particular, they 
are induced by engaging tasks, irrespective of the source 
of motivation. Although the specific language is different 
from what has been typically used to describe hyperfocus 
(engagement vs fun/interesting), it is arguable that in context 
they mean the same thing. There is no explicit evidence that 
flow induces intense states of sustained and selective atten-
tion. However, based the reported effects of flow, it is rea-
sonable to hypothesize that sustained and selective attention 
likely play a significant role. Moreover, applying a cognitive 
framework can provide a reasonable account of how intense 
states of attention could lead to the reported effects of flow. 
There is ample evidence that flow states induce a “dimin-
ished perception of non-task related stimuli”, though this 
has been only reported in subjective questionnaires, after the 
flow state had ended. To date, there have been no explicit 
cognitive or psychometric measurements taken during a flow 
state. Regardless, the subjective reports match the anecdotal 
reports of hyperfocus closely. Finally, there is some limited 
evidence that flow states improve task performance, but 
this is all correlational and indirect. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that flow states and hyperfocus appear to be the 
same phenomena, just with different names and initially 
reported in different fields of psychology. That being said, 
more research will be necessary to confirm and strengthen 
this claim (Table 3).
“In the zone” states show no evidence that they are 
induced by fun or interesting tasks. They do show some 
evidence that they are characterized by intense states of sus-
tained attention, but it is unclear how “intense” these states 
really are. “In the zone” states seem to reflect the upper 
range of normal fluctuations in attentional performance, 
rather than a distinct state of attention. “In the zone” states 
also show clear evidence of increased distractor suppression, 
resulting in a diminished perception of non-task relevant 
stimuli. Finally, there is no evidence that “in the zone” states 
result in improved task performance. Overall, the evidence 
leads us to conjecture that while “in the zone” states may 
still be mediated by similar mechanisms to hyperfocus, they 
are nevertheless distinct phenomena. More research will be 
needed to investigate this possibility (Table 3).
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Hyperfocus in psychiatric disorders
References to hyperfocus most frequently arise in research 
on ADHD, schizophrenia, and autism. Each disorder is 
reported to increase the frequency and/or magnitude of 
hyperfocus states, sometimes in different contexts. This phe-
notypic overlap may not be surprising given evidence for a 
genetic overlap across the three conditions (Cross-Disorder 
Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium, 2013). For 
each population, we will review how hyperfocus has been 
measured, the general consensus on how hyperfocus affects 
these populations, and we will provide constructive criticism 
about the methods and analyses used in each. There will also 
be a discussion about whether the measures of hyperfocus 
used across populations reflect the same process or not.
Hyperfocus and ADHD
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is character-
ized by clinically significant (i.e., it interferes with daily life) 
hyperactivity, impulsivity, and inattention. It should be noted 
that, despite its seemingly self-descriptive name, ADHD is 
not solely a disorder of attention, but also executive func-
tions (Roberts, Martel, & Nigg, 2017; Castellanos, Xavier, 
Sonuga-Barke, Milham, & Tannock 2006; Willcutt, Doyle, 
Nigg, Faraone, & Pennington 2005). Moreover, there are 
three subtypes of ADHD (inattentive, hyperactive, and com-
bined), which may even be distinct disorders (Milich, Balen-
tine, & Lynam 2001; Roberts and Milich, 2013). According 
to the DSM-V (APA, 2013), one of the symptoms of ADHD 
is that the child “often does not seem to listen when spo-
ken to directly”. While the DSM-V does not explicitly refer 
to this symptom (or any other symptom for that matter) as 
hyperfocus, references to it as a symptom of ADHD are per-
vasive in academic literature (Goodwin and Oberacker, 2011; 
Travis, 2010; Carver, 2009; Kahl and Whal, 2006; Ozel-Kizil 
et al., 2013; Schecklmann et al., 2008; Sklar, 2013; see also 
Table 1). Indeed, Hupfeld et al. (2019) found that patients 
with ADHD experience hyperfocus more often than healthy, 
neurotypical controls both in general and across a range of 
specific settings (in school, during hobbies, during “screen 
time”, and in the “real world”). In addition, although hyperfo-
cus is seemingly antithetical to the association of ADHD with 
inattention and impulsivity, it is often reported as a positive 
state in individuals with ADHD because they actually engage 
in tasks for longer periods of time than is typical (Goodwin 
and Oberacker, 2011; Travis, 2010).
Research into hyperfocus and ADHD is extremely lim-
ited. We were only able to find one study that explicitly 
attempted to measure cognitive and neural differences in 
hyperfocus between ADHD and neurotypical populations. 
In this study, Sklar (2013) took EEG measurements while 
ADHD and neurotypical participants played a first-person 
shooter game, ostensibly measuring brain activity during a 
hyperfocus state. In this study, hyperfocus was essentially 
defined to be identical to flow, as described by Csikszent-
mihalyi (1997, 2000). There were a few important findings. 
First, patients with ADHD showed reduced alpha and beta 
levels in the frontal lobe relative to controls while playing 
the game; and although not significant (but mentioned in 
light of small sample sizes) alpha and beta levels decreased 
over the course of the game for the ADHD patients, but 
increased for the controls. This was interpreted as evidence 
that ADHD patients required less cognitive effort to play the 
game, in line with the reported experiences of hyperfocus. 
Second, in the frontal midline, delta wave activity increased 
significantly over the course of the game (and it was reported 
that theta wave activity increased at a trend level; p < .10). 
It was speculated that this might reflect the “experience of 
the activity as intrinsically rewarding” element of hyper-
focus. Third, in the parietal lobe, the mean absolute power 
was higher in the ADHD patients than the controls. This 
was notable because typically ADHD patients show lower 
parietal activation than controls, which is thought to reflect 
impaired attentional process in ADHD. Sklar (2013) argued 
that these results supported the notion that impairments to 
attention may be context-specific in patients with ADHD. 
In other words, it is possible that patients with ADHD are 
not impaired when in a hyperfocus state and may even have 
enhanced attentional control. And fourth, a post-experiment 
questionnaire revealed that patients with ADHD experienced 
a more distorted perception of time, possibly supporting the 
notion that they did in fact experience hyperfocus during 
the task.
However, some methodological aspects need to be con-
sidered for a better understanding of the results. First, there 
is a question of whether or not the participants (both ADHD 
and neurotypical) experienced hyperfocus while playing 
the games. Sklar (2013), like Weber et al. (2009), argued 
that media, such as video games, provided the appropriate 
environment to induce hyperfocus/flow states. Noteworthy, 
Weber et al.’s (2009) framework is predicated on the notion 
that hyperfocus is the result of enhanced neural synchroniza-
tion between attentional and reward networks in the brain. 
However, Hoekzema et al. (2014)showed that patients with 
ADHD exhibited reduced functional connectivity between 
the dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex and various brain net-
works, and notably the DMN, during attention demanding 
tasks. Additionally, Querne et al. (2014; see also Fassbender, 
Scangos, Lesh, & Carter 2014) reported that, in contrast to 
neurotypical participants, children with ADHD did not show 
significant anti-phase synchronization (a form of inhibitory 
synchronization) between the DMN and task positive net-
works (TPN; brain regions that activate during “externally 
oriented” task—including the dorsal and ventral fronto-
parietal attention networks). This was interpreted as an 
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impairment in the ability of the TPN to suppress the DMN 
due to immaturity in ADHD-related brain development, even 
in adult ADHD (Castellanos and Elmaghrabi, 2017; Catel-
lanos et al., 2006; Kelly, Margulies, & Castellanos 2007; 
Scheres, Milham, Knutson, & Castellanos, Scheres et al., 
2007). Based on this evidence, it is questionable whether 
Weber et al.’s (2009) synchronization-based theory of hyper-
focus is likely, and by extension if simply playing games is 
enough to consistently induce hyperfocus across subjects. 
That being said, if attention deficits are contextual, as sug-
gested by Sklar (2013), then perhaps the connectivity defi-
cits identified by Hoekzema et al. (2014) and Querne et al. 
(2014) would not be found if the task induced hyperfocus.
Second, Sklar (2013) did not assess behavioral measures 
that might correspond with neurological measurements. 
Although this was an understandable methodological choice, 
the use of a video game provides a unique opportunity because 
performance over the course of the game can theoretically be 
measured (for example, most games have some kind of scoring 
mechanism) without having to probe the subject (admittedly, 
this is easier said than done). In general, it is good practice 
to include behavioral measurements to compare to neurologi-
cal measurements, so as to be able to establish a relationship 
between brain activity and behavior (i.e., linking hypotheses; 
Teller, 1984; Morgan, Melmoth, & Solomon, 2013).
ADHD is synonymous with a high degree of distract-
ibility and having a short attention span. However, the oft 
reported hyperfocusing states in this condition suggest that 
individuals with ADHD can, paradoxically, sustain atten-
tion excessively. In fact, attentional control may not be as 
impaired in patients with ADHD as once thought. For exam-
ple, Roberts, Ashinoff, Castellanos, and Carrasco (2018) 
have shown that spatial covert attention is functionally intact 
in adults with ADHD. Therefore, sophisticated investigation 
of the nature of hyperfocus in ADHD is critically important 
as it may provide important etiological clues that have been 
previously overlooked due to a focus on “distractibility”. 
Moreover, despite the ubiquity of reports of hyperfocus in 
patients with ADHD, it is not reflected in the DSM criteria 
for a diagnosis. Perhaps this should be reconsidered since, 
based on anecdotal evidence, hyperfocus appears to be a 
core symptom.
Hyperfocus and autism
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are neurodevelopmental 
disorders associated with impairments in social develop-
ment, language, and repetitive, circumscribed behaviors/
interests. Two defining symptoms of ASD are “(B1) Ste-
reotyped or repetitive motor movements, use of objects, 
or speech (e.g., simple motor stereotypies, lining up toys 
or flipping objects, echolalia, idiosyncratic phrases)” and 
“(B3) Highly restricted, fixated interests that are abnormal 
in intensity or focus (e.g., strong attachment to or preoccu-
pation with unusual objects, excessively circumscribed or 
perseverative interest)” (APA, 2013). Of particular interest 
here are the cases where individuals with autism exhibit an 
intense focus on a particular behavior or topic, which are 
sometimes explicitly referred to as hyperfocus (although 
usually anecdotally; Mayes, 2014; Clark, 2016; Fein, 2015; 
Bombaci, 2012). The term hyperfocus is also sometimes 
used to refer to stereotypic behavior or stimming (short for 
self-stimulatory behavior; Bombaci, 2012—see Table 1). 
However, these are distinct phenomena that co-occur in ASD 
and need to be treated as such, with hyperfocus referring to 
symptom B3 and not B1, although we recognize that the 
two sets of symptoms may be difficult to tease apart from a 
phenomenological and clinical perspective. Here, we focus 
on studies that appear to get at the phenomenon of hyperfo-
cus in ASD, rather than stereotyped behaviors or stimming.
To our knowledge, there are no studies that specifically 
attempt to measure behavior or cognitive performance 
Table 3  Evidence for the phenomenology of hyperfocus during “in the zone” or “flow” states (color figure online)
Features of Hyperfocus In the Zone Flow 
Fun/Interesng None Good 
Intense Concentraon Limited Speculave 
Reduced Percepon of Irrelevant/        
Non-Task Related Smuli Good Good 
Improved Task Performance None Limited 
The colored boxes indicate the quality and quantity of the evidence relating to different features of hyperfocus. In the online version, green indi-
cates good evidence, yellow indicates limited or speculative evidence, and red indicates no evidence. In the print version, white indicates good 
evidence, light grey indicates limited or speculative evidence, and dark grey indicates no evidence
 Psychological Research
1 3
during hyperfocus or flow states in ASD. In a review paper, 
Geurts et al. (2009) defined hyperfocus in the context of 
ASDs as “difficulties in shifting attention, disengaging 
from details”. So, it might be surprising to learn that some 
fundamental attentional processes appear to be intact in 
patients with ASD, including exogenous and endogenous 
spatial attention (Grubb et al., 2013a, b) and attentional 
disengagement (Fischer, Plessow, Dreisbach, & Goschke 
2014), although other aspects of attention have been shown 
to be deficient. For example, Keehn, Westerfield, Müller, 
& Townsend, (2017) found that children with ASD, unlike 
typically developing children, showed no behavioral or elec-
trophysiological evidence of attentional capture.
Geurts, Corbett, and Solomon (2009) also proposed that 
hyperfocus in ASD was associated with cognitive flexibil-
ity (the ability to re-allocate cognitive resources based on 
the situation; Brady et al., 2017; South, Ozonoff, & Mcma-
hon, 2007; Hill and Bird, 2006; Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, & 
Lai, 2005). The neural correlates of cognitive flexibility in 
ASD are usually assessed using attention or task switching 
paradigms, such as the Wisconsin card sorting test (WCST; 
Yeung, Han, Sze, & Chan 2016) or reversal learning tasks 
(D’Cruz, Mosconi, Ragozzino, Cook, & Sweeney, 2016). 
In these tasks, individuals with ASD have exhibited hypo-
activation in the prefrontal cortex, striatum, and parietal 
cortex (Shafritz, Dichter, Baranek, & Belger, 2008; Gilbert, 
Bird, Brindley, Frith, & Burgess 2008; Yeung et al., 2016; 
D’Cruz et al., 2016; Gomot et al., 2006), which is thought 
to reflect impairments in the ability to shift between differ-
ent behaviors. Important to our purposes, this hypoactiva-
tion has been associated with stereotyped behaviors, which 
may be confounded with hyperfocus. However, D’Cruz et al. 
(2016) noted that hypoactivation in a reinforcement learning 
task was specifically associated with unpredictable task out-
comes. They suggested that uncertainty may induce anxiety 
in patients with ASD, motivating them to maintain behav-
iors with predictable outcomes and resist novelty. Thus, it 
is unclear if ASD-related deficits in cognitive flexibility 
are related to hyperfocus, stereotyped behaviors, or other 
processes.
Overall, it appears as if hyperfocus is a real phenomenon 
that occurs in ASD, but care must be taken to distinguish 
it from other symptoms such as stereotypic behaviors. 
Research into hyperfocus in ASD is important because, as 
of now, it is unclear if hyperfocus is a primary symptom or 
a secondary symptom that is merely induced by other ASD-
related behaviors. It is possible that mechanisms underlying 
hyperfocus behaviors are not autism-specific, but rather that 
ASD behaviors happen to trigger the same kind of hyper-
focus seen in the general population more frequently or 
strongly.
Hyperfocus and schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is a disorder characterized by abnormal social 
behavior, deficits in emotional processing, and psychosis. 
Symptoms of schizophrenia are divided into three catego-
ries: positive symptoms, negative symptoms, and cognitive 
dysfunction (APA, 2013). Positive symptoms are those that 
individuals with schizophrenia can experience that are not 
present in the healthy population. These include hallucina-
tions, delusions, and other forms of psychosis. Negative 
symptoms are deficits in cognition or emotion in individu-
als with schizophrenia that are not impaired in the healthy 
population. These include, but are not limited to, anhedonia, 
flat affect, and lack of motivation. Cognitive dysfunction 
refers to deficits across a wide range of cognitive abilities. 
In the last few years, a hyperfocusing hypothesis of schizo-
phrenia has been developed (see Luck, Hahn, Leonard, & 
Gold, 2019 for a review of this hypothesis; Luck et al., 2014; 
Gray et al., 2014; Hahn et al., 2016; Sawaki et al., 2017; 
Kreither et al., 2017). Here, hyperfocus is defined as the use 
of processing resources more intensely (i.e., stronger work-
ing memory representation), but more narrowly compared 
to healthy control subjects.
Luck et al. (2014; Gray et al., 2014) showed that a colored 
distractor that matched a color held in working memory had 
a greater distracting effect during saccadic eye movements 
in individuals with schizophrenia than in healthy controls. 
They argued that the individuals with schizophrenia had 
generated a more intense working memory representation 
of the color because they had focused more intensely (i.e., 
hyperfocused) on it. Additionally, Leonard et al. (2013) 
showed that the neural mechanisms underlying the work-
ing memory differences between individuals with schizo-
phrenia and healthy controls are not the same as those that 
underlie general individual differences in working memory. 
They argued this reflected a deficit in the ability of individu-
als with schizophrenia to distribute their attention broadly. 
Though the authors are careful to note that attributing these 
results to hyperfocusing is a conjecture, they do suggest that 
it provides converging evidence for such a theory.
More recent studies have also supported the hyperfocus-
ing theory of schizophrenia. Sawaki et al. (2017) found that 
individuals with schizophrenia showed electrophysiological 
evidence of abnormal attentional focus towards goal-relevant 
stimulus features. Participants had to respond when a cen-
trally located circle matched a pre-defined target color, while 
ignoring two colored distractor circles that horizontally 
flanked the central circle. On some trials, when the central 
circle was a non-target color, one of the distractor circles 
could match the target color (i.e., a goal-relevant feature 
embedded in a distractor). To account for frequently reported 
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deficits in goal maintenance, the target color was presented 
constantly between trials throughout the experiment. They 
found that on these trials, neurotypical controls exhibited 
a significant distractor positivity event related potential 
(ERP) component, a measure of attentional suppression. 
This suggested that attention was not directed towards the 
distractor containing goal-relevant information. However, 
the individuals with schizophrenia exhibited a significant 
N2pc (N2 posterior-contralateral) ERP component, a meas-
ure of spatial attention shifts and focus towards a lateralized 
stimulus. This suggested that they actually focused their 
attention (or hyperfocused) on the distractor containing goal-
relevant information. The authors argued that this was evi-
dence that individuals with schizophrenia hyperfocused on 
goal-relevant information when maintaining a task set. This 
is consistent with some of the most commonly reported fea-
tures of hyperfocus, particularly improved task performance. 
In fact, Beck et al. (2016) reported that, as a consequence 
of hyperfocusing on goal-related information, people with 
schizophrenia showed significantly better performance on a 
probabilistic visual search task.
Kreither et al. (2017) addressed another prediction of the 
hyperfocus hypothesis, namely that individuals with schizo-
phrenia would focus attention more narrowly, in addition to 
more intensely. They interpreted this to mean that hyper-
focus would be strongest for stimuli in central vision, but 
weak in peripheral vision. Participants had to discriminate 
between standard and oddball stimuli at either central or 
peripheral locations. They found, based on an abnormal 
P3b ERP component (a measure of higher-level process-
ing resources), individuals with schizophrenia were able 
to suppress peripheral stimuli when they were responding 
to centrally located stimuli, but could not suppress central 
stimuli when they were responding to peripheral stimuli. The 
healthy controls exhibited the opposite pattern of results. 
Moreover, they showed that the P3b results correlated with 
performance in the useful field of view task (UFOV), which 
measures distributed attention. Individuals with schizophre-
nia showed worse performance than controls.
Considering the symptom variability associated with 
schizophrenia, a natural question is whether hyperfocus is 
associated with negative symptoms, positive symptoms, or 
cognitive dysfunction. Luck et al. (2014) tested for, but did 
not find, a correlation between hyperfocusing and the sever-
ity of positive (BPRS; Faustman and Overall, 1999) or nega-
tive (SANS; Andreasen, 1989) symptoms in their individuals 
with schizophrenia. However, they obtained a single sub-
scale score for each symptom type (positive and negative) 
and did not assess if individual symptoms were associated 
with hyperfocus. If only a subset of positive (like delusions) 
or negative symptoms are associated with hyperfocus or 
hypersalience, then a generalized subscale score may not be 
sensitive enough to reflect these effects. Luck et al. (2019) 
reported that there is an association across several studies 
between cognitive dysfunction and the intensity of hyperfo-
cus. Furthermore, they proposed that hyperfocus may be a 
cause of cognitive dysfunction, rather than a consequence, 
but are careful to note that this is speculative. They further 
note that it is unclear, due to a lack of research in unmedi-
cated patients and patients with current psychotic symptoms, 
if hyperfocus is associated with the positive and/or nega-
tive symptoms of schizophrenia. Prentky (2001) argued that 
patients that exhibit positive symptoms show “higher left 
than right hemispheric activity. Thus, there is a hypothetical 
optimal hemispheric imbalance that promotes a constructive, 
task-specific hyperfocus on detail”. There is also evidence 
that patients with schizophrenia show a greater preoccu-
pation with delusional beliefs than healthy controls (Sisti 
et al., 2012), which could be interpreted as hyperfocusing 
on the belief. In fact, many descriptions of individuals with 
schizophrenia report the experience of hallucinations being 
distracting and engrossing, even to the point of exhaustion 
(Walsh, Hochbrueckner, Corcoran & Spence, 2016; Flana-
gan et al., 2012). This suggests that individuals with positive 
symptoms are more likely to experience hyperfocus, or at 
least that positive symptoms may induce hyperfocus.
More generally, although we do not doubt the results or 
value of the “hyperfocusing theory of schizophrenia”, it is 
debateable if its operational definition of hyperfocusing 
reflects the same process that is typically described in anec-
dotal reports of hyperfocusing. The hyperfocusing theory 
does appear to reflect intense concentration and improved 
task performance. And, although it is generally consistent 
with reports that people who hyperfocus “tune everything 
else out”, it is not clear if, in anecdotal reports, people were 
always focused on stimuli at the center of vision. A future 
study will need to assess if hyperfocus can only occur at the 
center of vision or the loci of hyperfocus can move, such as 
with the spotlight of attention. Moreover, there was noth-
ing particularly fun or interesting about the tasks. A further 
consideration was that the effect of “hyperfocus” was rela-
tively consistent over time in these studies, which is incon-
sistent with the notion that hyperfocus reflects an irregular, 
inconsistent state of attention that is difficult to induce. One 
possibility is that the “hyperfocus theory” studies were tap-
ping into a visual attention counterpart of hypersalience 
(rather than hyperfocus) that has been previously reported 
in individuals with schizophrenia in decision-making tasks. 
Speechley, Whitman, and Woodward (2010) showed that 
individuals with delusions exhibited a bias for evidence that 
matched their expectations, which may explain the results 
of Luck et al. (2014).
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Is hyperfocus the same phenomenon 
across psychiatric conditions?
Does hyperfocus, reported in the ADHD, autism, and schizo-
phrenia literature, refer to the same phenomenon in all three 
conditions? Before we can address this, we must first con-
sider more generally if these disorders present with similar 
symptoms.
ADHD and autism Panagiotidi, Overton, and Stafford 
(2017; also see Kern, Geier, Sykes, Geier, & Deth, 2015; 
Banaschewski et al., 2005) investigated co-occurring traits in 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and ADHD. They assessed 
334 healthy, neurotypical participants with two ADHD 
questionnaires and two ASD questionnaires. Their most 
relevant finding for our purposes was a moderate positive 
correlation between the attention switching subscale of the 
autism quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
Martin, & Clubley 2001) and the inattention subscales from 
both ADHD questionnaires (The Wender Utah Rating Scale 
and the Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale; Ward, Wender, & 
Reimherr 1993; Kessler et al., 2005). They defined hyperfo-
cus as “difficulties in diverting attention between tasks” and 
inattention as “difficulty in sustaining attention”, suggesting 
that these phenomena were reflected in the questionnaire 
results. They suggested that ADHD and ASD may share a 
common etiology, and that hyperfocus and inattention may 
be related to a common mechanism. Therefore, ADHD and 
autism present with similar symptoms, possibly including a 
similar form of hyperfocus.
ADHD and schizophrenia Research has shown that 
ADHD and schizophrenia present with similar cognitive 
deficits in executive functions and attentional function 
(Banaschewski et al., 2005). In fact, ADHD and schizo-
phrenia cohorts are frequently used as psychiatric control 
groups for each other. However, there has been no explicit 
comparison of hyperfocus in these groups. That being said, 
it is possible that both ADHD and schizophrenia present 
with a similar form of hyperfocus.
Autism and schizophrenia According to Crespi and Bad-
cock (2008), “psychosis and autism represent two extremes 
on a cognitive spectrum with normality at its center. Social 
cognition is thus underdeveloped in autism, but hyper-
developed to dysfunction in psychosis”. Recent studies 
have provided support for this spectrum account showing 
opposite attentional effects based on the relative expression 
of autism and psychosis in healthy participants (Abu-Akel 
et al., 2016a, b, c, 2018) and in patient populations (Abu-
Akel et al., 2018). In comparing attentional set shifting, 
Abu-Akel et al. (2018) showed that children with autism had 
difficulties with extra-dimensional shifts, and children with 
schizotypal disorders had difficulties with intra-dimensional 
shifts. Based on this, it seems unlikely that patients with 
autism and schizophrenia would exhibit a similar form of 
hyperfocus, since their attentional control patterns seems to 
reflect a diametric relationship.
However, an alternative interpretation is that patients 
with these disorders simply hyperfocus on different types 
of stimuli, making it difficult to see a direct comparison. 
Crespi and Backcock (2008) conceptualized symptoms of 
ASD and schizophrenia related to under- and over-mentaliz-
ing (i.e., capacity for theory of mind), respectively (see also 
Abu-Akel and Bailey, 2000; Frith, 2004). In this conception, 
patients with ASD under-interpret social cues, leading to 
social withdrawal which would arguably result in focusing 
on things rather than people, and patients with schizophrenia 
over-interpret social cues, leading to symptoms like paranoid 
delusions, which is interpretable as a focus on people and 
their intentions. Langdon and Brock (2008), however, argued 
that this interpretation is incomplete as patients with schizo-
phrenia in particular exhibit both over- and under-mentaliz-
ing. Furthermore, using a social judgement task, Stanfield 
et al. (2017) showed that deficits in social cognition in ASD 
and schizophrenia are mediated by distinct neural correlates. 
Thus, although additional research is needed to confirm if 
phenomenon like hyperfocus is expressed via similar mecha-
nisms in these disorders, it does not appear likely.
Are they the same? Based on the evidence, we propose 
that the version of hyperfocus described in this review and 
more generally in anecdotal reports, occurs in both ADHD 
and autism, although in autism the term is often incorrectly 
used to refer to stereotypic and self-stimulatory behavior. 
The evidence for hyperfocus in schizophrenia is less clear. 
Although there is a so-called “hyperfocus theory of schizo-
phrenia”, we propose that the effects they have identified 
reflect hypersalience rather than hyperfocus. Aside from 
these studies, references to hyperfocus in the schizophrenia 
literature are few.
Conclusions
This review discussed the well-known, but poorly investi-
gated phenomenon of hyperfocus, which is referenced in 
the ADHD, autism, and schizophrenia literature. Until now, 
there has been no clear operational definition of hyperfo-
cus, leading to a wide range of behaviors being referred 
to as hyperfocus. To eliminate confusion in the future, we 
provided a clear and testable definition of hyperfocus that 
comprised four criteria: (1) to engage in hyperfocus, the task 
has to be engaging (i.e. fun, interesting, important, etc.). 
(2) Hyperfocus is characterized by an intense state of sus-
tained or selective attention. (3) When engaged in hyperfo-
cus, there is a diminished perception of non-task relevant 
stimuli. (4) During a hyperfocus state, task performance 
improves. Although this definition may change in light of 
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future research, it provides a reasonable starting point for the 
investigation of this phenomenon. Moreover, we proposed 
and provided supporting evidence for the notion that the 
phenomenon of flow is synonymous with hyperfocus. Last, 
we reviewed the references to hyperfocus in the psychiatric 
literature to determine if they fit with our newly established 
definition. We propose that the hyperfocus referenced in the 
ADHD and autism literature does fit with our definition, 
but the hyperfocus referred to in the schizophrenia literature 
does not.
In all, the purpose of this review was to bring attention 
to an important, but generally forgotten or ignored phenom-
enon that may be a critical element in several psychiatric 
disorders. We hope that our operational definition of hyper-
focus will facilitate the development of new research para-
digms that are specifically tailored to assess the hyperfocus 
state and underlying mechanisms in both healthy and psy-
chiatric populations. One possibly fruitful avenue for future 
research is to explore the potential of gamification of cogni-
tive psychology paradigms combined with assessments of 
performance over the course of the task (like in Esterman 
et al., 2012, 2014). This may allow researchers to meet the 
necessary criteria to both induce hyperfocus states, assess 
when a hyperfocus state is occurring in time, and measure 
cognitive performance during these time periods.
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